[GM: several posts from one of surprisingly few RKBA/III-percenter blogs that I consider readable. I disagree with him on some accounts, but I have printed off much of his stuff and spread redacted versions around so the others can see what I think we're doing right... and wrong.]
http://mountainguerrilla.wordpress.com/2013/09/04/cellular-construction-a-basic-introductory-primer/
Cellular Construction: A Basic Introductory Primer
(The previous article, from an anonymous member of the Special
Forces community, led me to decide to put together a short article on
cell construction for undergrounds, and how it can be done within your
community, for community defense purposes. This has been discussed in
depth in several classes, as time allowed within the
program-of-instruction, or when specifically requested by a
participant..–JM)
One of the pre-supposed greatest weaknesses of irregular force
organizations is the obvious risk of compromise by aggressor forces. The
ability to grab-and-bag a single member of an organization, thus
leading to all other members of the organization being rolled up easily,
through the exploitation of interrogation, rightfully tends to scare
the ever-loving-daylights out of many people. This historically led to the
fatally-flawed concept of “Leaderless Resistance,” purportedly developed
by US Army Colonel Ulius Louis Amoss, a former intelligence-branched
officer and rabid anti-communist in the 1960s, as a back-up to organized
resistance operations in the event of an invasion by the USSR. While I
certainly don’t know the (presumably-late) colonel, I would guess that,
as a professional, his hypothesis was, in a resistance against an
outside invader, the missing leadership and core mission would be
provided by the shared goal of ejecting the invader.
The concept was re-vitalized and popularized amongst the denizens of the WN movement by that paragon of virtue (
PLEASE, PLEASE note the sarcasm)
and rational though, Louis Beam. The problem with this approach was
still “solved” by the presumably shared commitment to resist against the
government.[1]
For community defense considerations in the current world however,
there are numerous issues with the concept of leaderless resistance is
the lack of shared information, and all the other issues pointed out in
the previous article. We’ll stay away from that in this instance, and
focus on how cells can be developed in a rational, intelligent manner
that provides maximum security and operational functionality.
For the purposes of this article, I’m going to steal a page from
American Mercenary and semi-fictionalize this, or at least turn it into a
semi-narrative….oh, I don’t know the right terms to use.
The Leadership Cell
Somewhere in Montana, in a small community (
not that there are a whole lot of large communities in Big Sky Country)
of 5000-10,000 people, a group of buddies have been talking and
training together for several years, preparing for the troubles that all
of us can see coming. As the world becomes more dangerous, they begin
to realize that their six families aren’t going to be able to do much
besides struggle for a subsistence level existence. No opportunity to
restore Constitutional Rule-of-Law in their community, or provide help
and hope for their neighbors, when all they will have time to do is
struggle to grow, gather, and store food and provide inadequate security
for their little retreat position.
We’ll call them Bob, Bill, Ben, Bert, Brian, and Brad (
ain’t alliteration fun!?).
The B-Boys decide that they need to start expanding their organization,
providing training for other people, and providing the ability for
themselves to have an expanding belt of security around their families,
in order to enhance their preparedness. After all, being intelligent
guys, they recognize that security is more effective, the further out
you can project force away from your HQ facility. They’re also, like
most people, concerned about security of the organization and not ending
up renditioned to some shit-hole prison in Syria, under the control of
US-sponsored Al-Qaeda operatives posing as anti-regime freedom fighters.
As they discuss it amongst themselves and their wives, one of the wives comes to the intelligent conclusion (
I don’t know about your family, but in mine, HH6 has ALL the brains. I’m just the brawn) that they should base it on a cellular construction as they expand the network.
The problem of course, is they all have friends and associates,
outside of The Group, but they don’t necessarily know the
preparedness-oriented leanings of those friends and associates, and they
are concerned about blindly bringing outsiders into contact with The
Group.
They decide, based on the advice of Bert’s brother Bud, a retired
Special Forces Sergeant-Major, that they need to develop independent
cells, based on their local networks of friends and neighbors.
In other words, Bob has friends and associates that the rest of the
B-Boys aren’t familiar with, or aren’t familiar enough with to call
“friends” or have a predisposition to trust enough to discuss such
topics with. In reflection, each of the other B-Boys similarly has
friends and associates that aren’t known to, or aren’t familiar with the
others of the group, or Bob. Likewise with their respective spouses.
So, each of the B-Boys assigns themselves a role, or is assigned a
role, within the group. Bob, being a local cop, knows not only all the
cops and security guys in the area, but also many of the local gun guys.
He decides, or has it decided for him, that he will work on developing
direct-action security cells. So, Bob heads out, and over the course of
the next several months, independent of the rest of the group, starts
three or four groups, or joins three or four groups, of
paramilitary-centric preparedness cells.
Bill meanwhile, being a local wheat farmer, starts talking to his
friends and associates in the local farming community about
preparedness, and ensuring they have enough crops in the ground to feed
all the local folks. In doing so, he begins to realize that most of
those guys not only have wheat and other feed crops, but large trucks
and trailers. So, Bill doesn’t only start food-based logistics cells,
but a transportation cell that help with escape-and-evasion operations
by moving evaders out of the immediate operational area.
The list, obviously goes on, based not just on vocation, but also on
avocation and social networks. The members of Bill’s subordinate cell
don’t need to know what other cells Bill has developed, and shouldn’t.
Likewise, Bob’s cells don’t need to know what Bill’s cells are, or even
that Bill exists, and vice versa.
If the self-appointed leadership cell decides that an operation needs
to be conducted, they determine that Bob’s Direct-Action (DA) cells
will conduct a raid. In the conduct of their raid, one member of the
cell is severely wounded.
Fortunately, because they took a cellular approach to their
organization, they have a transportation network in place, so after
stabilizing the casualty, they leave him in a pre-determiend rally point
location, and leave. A member of the transportation cell stops by and
loads up the casualty, then drives him to another pre-determiend
location, close to, but not proximate to, a safe house. The driver drops
off the casualty and leaves. A member of the medical cell then stops by
the location, picks up the casualty, and moves him to the safe house,
where the medical cell is able to provide advanced medical care to heal
the casualty.[2]
The cut-outs between cells provided by temporarily dropping the
patient in rally points, provides security from compromise from cell to
cell.
Within the cells, there is the obvious risk of compromise if one
member is captured or turned. Only to his own cell and cell leader
however. The obvious extension of this is that if one of Bill’s cells is
compromised, Bill may be compromised, leading to compromise of the
entire leadership cell, and then top-down, the entire organization.
There are four basic solutions to this potential problem.
- ensure that, once operational, the leadership cell is secured. This
is where the concept of a secure guerrilla base area becomes paramount.
It’s one thing to have an operational cell compromised and give up the
name or identity of a leadership cadre. It’s something else entirely to
leave that leadership cadre in a place or position where he/she is
susceptible to capture that puts the entire organization at risk (it
is important to recognize that this is not saying that the leadership
should remain isolated and not contribute deliberate action and efforts).
- Use aliases and disguises when working with subordinate cells.
Unfortunately, in a local, community-centric effort, this is completely
unworkable, since it reduces the efforts to build rapport and a
community-centric organization.
- If someone is captured, there needs to be a way to allow his/her
cell to know within hours that he has been compromised, allowing them to
disperse and disappear into the underground, as well as
stopping/destroying operations that the detainee may be privy to
information about. This is an effective method, but may be unrealistic.
- Sit home, shut up, and do whatever you’re told by your betters in the bureaucracy, already.
Ultimately, you need to understand that, as scary as compromise and
capture by hostile elements is, if you’re basing all of your decisions
and planning solely on that fear, you’ve already died. Do what is
necessary to be effective, be as safe and secure as you can be, while
still being effective, and drive on already, accepting the fact
that, we’re all dead, and we don’t get to choose the time. All we get
to do is choose how we’ll be remembered.
DOL,
John
Footnotes:
1. One problem I've noticed with cell structures, that MountainGuerrilla didn't seem to mention, is that you don't necessarily know who you're working for, or with. Mark Mirabello tells of an American who thought he was spying on the USA for Israel and was actually spying on the USA for the USSR. So are you really fighting the Feds to restore liberty and constitutional government to America, or are you just paving the way for China and/or the International Caliphate?
Another issue is one of fellow travelers. Not everyone who hates the Establishment wants the same thing that you do, and any cell system that grows big enough will soon start resembling a telephone game. You might start out with a group of Patriotic American gun owners, but in a few years might find that one of your newest cells is full of Pagan White Nationalists, another is full of Islamic Black Nationalists, and one is a bunch of Baptist Mestizo Anarchists (hah hah). Are you going to be okay with that, or will you decide that maybe you were better off under Obama? (In all fairness, Karl does touch on this in the comments... so succinctly in fact that I'm going to repost him too.)
2. This is a weakness I've noticed with my own operation; we have enough med skills that we'll be okay mild injuries, but if someone comes home dragging their guts behind them? Well...
Found elsewhere, more fuel for the fire:
Covert Cell Networks, building, operating, maintaining.
A Covert Cell Network is necessary for the operation of a covert
resistance movement against a totalitarian regime. Most people in
America think of the French Resistance of World War II as the model.
While that is to some degree a valid model, few would be able to explain
in detail how it worked, and why it worked, and how the Germans were
unable to unravel it in detail. It is worth noting that Al Queda is also
a valid model of how a Covert Cell Network can operate – and after a
decade of intense US Intelligence Forces focused on it, the actual map
of that network has been effectively cracked, and is in the process of
being unraveled in detail. Even if the network continues to operate, the
key leadership and organization that existed prior to 2001 has been
killed or captured. The French Resistance only had to operate for at
most five years (1940-1945).
“I can just get all my friends together, come up with neat codenames, and then go out and build a resistance from that, right?”
You do that, and it is only a matter of time until the regime rolls you
all up in one fell swoop. Guerrilla Warfare/Resistance
Movements/Unconventional Warfare has to go in phases. You cannot skip
straight to launching a coup d’état or Restoration of the Republic with
you and your drinking buddies or pool league. There have been famous
attempts at such. Members were killed. Leaders jailed.
“Ok, what about leading a pitch-fork and torch wielding mob to storm the
Bastille/Capitol/Reichstag/Parliament/State House/Town Hall/VFW post?”
Some of those have actually happened. Context and preparation is
important to understand. The French didn’t just get up one day and
decide to storm the Bastille, no matter how much they may cling to it as
a national myth. It took preparation, organization, and time to get
from “Let them eat cake” to heads quite literally rolling in the
streets.[1]
“Ok. Where do I start?”
As Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt said upon realizing that they
had landed in the wrong place on Utah Beach on D-Day: “We’ll start the
war from here!” You’re convinced, right? You realize things are going
pear shaped, right? The Constitutional Republic has been effectively
overthrown/The One True King has been forced into hiding/The Aliens have
taken over/You aren’t going to get tickets to the Super Bowl this year.
You aren’t alone in this, right? You know like-minded people right?
Friends who agree with you? Good. If you are all alone in thinking these
things, you might want to consult a therapist/cleric/deity (greater or
lesser)/your mother. Odds are exceptionally good if any of the above has
in fact happened, you are not alone in recognizing this. Speaking it
may be dangerous. Acting on it more so. Wars may be fought for broad
concepts of ideologies and nations. Battles are fought for the buddies
in the foxhole next to you, or pinned down behind some cover just a few
meters away. You go to war as a patriot, but you fight as
friends/buddies/brothers. This is where you start. With your friends and
confidants. Problem is, ARE they your friends? Are they your
confidants? CAN they be trusted?[2]
Peer Networks
Peer Networking is mostly thought of from a computing realm. Different
computers on the same network are “peers” to each other. Each has the
same “authority” on the network as the next. Communication is “peer to
peer”. Social Networking sites map this style of networking into human
social interactions. If we had a network that encompassed everyone, you
could (the argument goes) get a message FROM anyone TO anyone in six
steps (six degrees of Kevin Bacon ring a bell?). While the actual
numbers may be argued, that’s the big idea. If you’ve ever played on
social networking sites, you can learn a great deal about your “friends”
networks, and even friends of friends. You no doubt have found some of
your friends and family’s comments/posts on such sites to be horribly
offensive/idiotic/irritating/infuriating/comical. Probably NOT a good
idea to plot the resistance against the Lizard People on Facebook.
Trust No one Someone.
We all know the X-Files catchphrase “Trust no one”. All well and good.
Except if you want to get something accomplished. What’s the point of an
underground to return the One True King to the throne if you aren’t
going to work with anyone? So, at the very start, you have to trust SOME
one. Just one. Not just anyone. You have to pick very carefully. If
merely speaking to the wrong person what you have come to realize means
you wind up in the reeducation camp, or disappeared into the gulags, you
can’t just grab someone off the street or from your fraternity and
confide in them at random. Pick carefully. Feel them out over time.
Gauge their positions, their potential dedication to the cause. A
mistake at this point is potentially a fatal blow to your involvement in
the cause (to get your super bowl tickets, right?), if not outright
fatal.
So you have someone you can trust with what is the most important,
dangerous secret you may ever have. Great. You have now entered the
realm of being a co-conspirator. Congratulations. Depending upon your
circumstances, this may now make you a felon/enemy of the state/enemy
combatant/insurgent. First question, once you both trust each other
this far, are either one of you ALREADY part of a resistance network? If
so, great! Welcome to the network (there are a few caveats that will
need to be addressed). If not… well that’s why I said “we’ll start the
war from here.”
Expanding your network
Some simple rules.
• Nobody gets added to the network without two members agreeing to it.
• Everybody gets a codename of some variety (yet more caveats…). If
Brian and Matt are the initial pair, and they want to add Steve, that’s
fine. Now Brian, Matt, and Steve are in the network. And they all know
each other. When Matt and Steve want to add Garry, but Garry doesn’t
know Brian, he shouldn’t know Brian except by a codename that has no
connection to who Brian is in public – just who he is in the network.
This is why you see popular culture references to “Agent Falcon” and
“Number 3” and “Agent K” and the like. So, we give Brian the codename
Falcon, Matt the codename Eagle, and Steve the codename Raven. When
Garry is added, he is referred to by his codename Owl. Owl and Falcon
never meet, and only know each other by their network codenames, and
only communicate though network members they know (in person, or via
whatever mechanism they were brought into the network. Beware of
internet only introductions – they are very easy to spoof/fake).
• Limit each member’s connections (Two connections is too tight, Falcon,
Raven, and Eagle each take up two connections each just to add Eagle by
mutual agreement of Falcon and Raven. Eight connections is too many –
if one of the group get caught/is a plant/turncoat, then everyone who
knows that member gets taken out as well – 7 more nodes. This is how you
unravel a cell network. Al Queda notably had some large cells, opening
up large groups to capture. Five to six connections is a happy medium
between robustness and risk.
• New members are not introduced around the network. They are mentioned only through channels, and only by codenames.
• Certain capabilities can only be performed by groups of people who
already know each other (an 8-man team is not going to sneak into the
alien mothership in any kind of coordinated fashion if they have never
worked together before, let alone even met). When such groups are
formed, they need to be treated as a single node in the network, and Ops
Node (or similar). One of them gets found out, the whole group gets
found out, etc. so the risks to them are much higher – plus sneaking
into the alien mothership is an inherently risky proposition, the
likelihood is that one or more of them won’t be coming back, so limit
the number of connections in/out of an Ops Node.
• Communication is relayed from node to node to node. Because every node
has at least two connections (unless there is damage to the network),
one channel is primary. Secondary channels are only to be used if the
primary is down (use of a secondary channel is indication that the
primary is lost/unavailable/compromised/now a pod person). In our above
example, Owl talks to Falcon via Eagle. If Eagle is eaten by the
lizards, Owl and Falcon communicate via Raven. The very fact that each
is hearing from the other by the secondary channel tells them that the
primary is gone.
• NO ONE IS TO KNOW THE NETWORK LAYOUT! If any node knows more than
their contacts to the wider network, they know too much about it. The
truth is, the Regime/Aliens/False King/NFL Commissioner will know far
more about the topology of the actual network than the members. If Owl
knows who Falcon is, Owl can give up Falcon (everyone cracks, it’s just a
question of when – you cannot give up what you do not know). Owl and
Falcon could even work with each other and know each other in public,
but they cannot know that they are in fact Owl and Falcon in the
network. Owl knows how to reach Falcon in the network. Falcon knows how
to reach Owl. That’s all they need to know about the layout. Anything
more gives the Regime/Aliens/NFL/NCAA too many chances to pick apart the
network. Remember, lives are quite literally on the line, as is the
cause.
• When a node is lost (Eagle got picked up by the regime/eaten by the
lizards), all nodes that know Eagle have to report along all their
channels that Eagle is gone; and for the network to discard all messages
for/from Eagle (caveats on reconnecting – what if Eagle was simply on
the run, not actually nabbed?)
So, now you have a basic network running. You are all keeping to 5-6
connections per person, except for Ops Nodes, right? Everyone has
codenames. No new members are being added unless two members agree to
add that member, right? Remember, with each new member, the odds that
it’s a Lizard/NFL Rep/Regime Plant increase. With each new member, the
number of people in the network increases, as does the overall risk of
detection. It’s not just YOUR life on the line, it’s the life of
everyone you know in the network (and in the real world possibly as
well). It’s the CAUSE on the line. It is important that the network
expand, but carefully (Especially early). As time goes on, the natural
growth of connections will start a rapid expansion (or the regime will
become effective at rolling it up, and we’re all doomed anyway).
At some point, if the network grows sufficiently, it will start bumping
into itself. I will reference one of the early questions “Are either one
of you already part of a network?” When that happens, you have
successfully created a link between branches. It is possible, if not
likely, that multiple parallel networks will exist.
Bridging these
networks is important, even if they are very different in origin/style.
Only together can we get our courtside seats/repel the alien
invasion/return the King to the throne. News of these bridges needs to
be disseminated through the existing network.[3]
Do Something
So, we have a network or series of networks of like-minded people. We’re
all talking to each other through these covert channels (You aren’t
talking openly about it in a Starbucks where the Praetorean Guard
happens to frequent, are you? You aren’t posting these in public
chatrooms on the internet are you? You ARE passing these covert messages
via some form of face-to-face or strong digital encryption right?
Right? If you are using electronic communication, you are destroying
your logs, right? You aren’t doing this via plaintext in email, or
keeping them in Gmail, right? RIGHT? RIGHT?) Remind me to put something
together about basic computer security/encryption – but in the
short-term, if you don’t understand what I’m talking about – keep it
face-to-face. Not phone. Not chat. Not email. Face to face, in private,
or dead-drop. (maybe I need to add some info on covert comms, ya
think?).
So, now what? We just sit back talking to each other and wait for things
to fall our way, right? NO. We have to DO something. What, that is up
to the network to decide. Don’t take unilateral action. Discuss it at
least with some other members of the network (who may discuss it with
more). If you advertise a capability, be sure you can deliver. If it is a
one-shot-and-done, make sure that it is known that you have one press
on this button and you are done. Time may come that it is needed. Be
sure you can deliver. The whole system may depend upon you doing what
you said you can do. You may have to pay the ultimate price to do it.
Damage
Any resistance network worth its’ salt will lose members for various and
sundry reasons. Some will be rounded up by the Lizard People or
Collaborators. Some will be killed doing something dangerous. Some will
be scared off for some reason. Some, and these are the most dangerous,
will be plants (or will become plants). There is a joke that most of the
members of some Mafia organizations were actually undercover Feds from
different offices all trying to find out everything they could on what
turned out to be other Feds with a cover story. In networking terms, the
loss of a node is “damage.” This is where having double-link connection
allows for immediate repair of any one lost node. A new backup link
will have to be created – with the caveat that you don’t want to
increase the links of neighboring nodes above critical thresholds. A
dead node is just a dead node. The dead tell no tales… except in the
digital age others can step into the digital footprints of the dead –
unless the critical information is only in the head of the dead node
(passwords, pincodes, dead drop locations, etc.). A captured node, on
the other hand, can be interrogated. Everything they know can be
extracted (you really think they’re not going to torture you to get
information out of your head that can help bring down the resistance?
Everyone breaks. Everyone). Breaking takes time, however. So, regular
communication between nodes should be frequent enough to detect that a
given node has gone off-line unexpectedly, give some warning that it may
have been compromised/turned. If a node KNOWS that a neighboring node
has been compromised, the warning can be sent to the whole network.
What’s this about plants? Wouldn’t the green leaves and potting soil
give them away? That would be great… but the real world doesn’t work
that way. A plant that stays and collects information is very, very
dangerous to the network. Part of the defense against this is that no
nodes relay the real identities of the any node to any other node. IF a
node is a plant or undetected they will only be able to reveal the
real-world identities of the nodes they directly interact with (if
you’ve been following the rules, that should be no more than 5-6
connections – bad, but survivable for a robust network). Use of PGP
Encrypted messaging system would be ideal. With public and private key
encryption, messages can be passed through intermediaries without the
intermediary being able to read it and relay it to the authorities.
While there are rumors of backdoors that the Feds can use, I have never
heard that from someone who actually understands cryptology. There is
also a large PGP infrastructure that exists in the world that can be
used to support such a comms system. Many email clients already support
PGP encryption (Thunderbird, for example) and are a good choice for
secure comms. Limiting the information intermediary nodes can actually
use is vital to limiting the damage of a plant or a turncoat. The real
hazards that remain from such are from being involved in operational
planning/analysis. As such, they have to actually know the subject
matter being discussed (not just an intermediary), thus they can relay
this to the authorities. This is why careful vetting of potential
members is so critical, but plants WILL find their way into a successful
organization. Members WILL become turncoats, even after coming through
in the clinch (ref. one of the Hero’s of the Revolution, Benedict
Arnold). Careful with the paranoia however, as you have to trust each
other in the network, and too much paranoia will see everyone turn on
each other. You have to trust that the network as a whole will detect
leaks, plants, and turncoats, and start to bypass them.
Covert Communication Techniques
We have a network, we know how to build it, how to manage it, how to
protect it, and how to repair it. Now, how do we actually communicate on
this network? Just use your iphone to call Brian, but use his codename
Falcon? Not a chance. Think Cell Phones are secure means of
communication? How about land lines? Surely computers are secure, right?
Ask anybody who works in the Cyber Security field, and they will tell
you that the average user is already screwed. If you use your computer
to talk over a network or phone-line to another computer, it can be
monitored. Even robust security only gets you so far, but by-and-large
the biggest problem with computers is the Dancing Bunnies Problem:
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/larryosterman/archive/2005/07/12/438284.aspx
“What’s the dancing bunnies problem?
It’s a description of what happens when a user receives an email message that says “click here to see the dancing bunnies”.
The user wants to see the dancing bunnies, so they click there. It
doesn’t matter how much you try to disuade them, if they want to see the
dancing bunnies, then by gum, they’re going to see the dancing bunnies.
It doesn’t matter how many technical hurdles you put in their way, if
they stop the user from seeing the dancing bunny, then they’re going to
go and see the dancing bunny.
There are lots of techniques for mitigating the dancing bunny problem.
There’s strict privilege separation – users don’t have access to any
locations that can harm them. You can prevent users from downloading
programs. You can make the user invoke magic commands to make code
executable (chmod +e dancingbunnies). You can force the user to input a
password when they want to access resources. You can block programs at
the firewall. You can turn off scripting. You can do lots, and lots
of things.
However, at the end of the day, the user still wants to see the dancing
bunny, and they’ll do whatever’s necessary to bypass your carefully
constructed barriers in order to see the bunny
We know that user’s will do whatever’s necessary. How do we know that?
Well, because at least one virus (one of the Beagle derivatives)
propogated via a password encrypted .zip file. In order to see the
contents, the user had to open the zip file and type in the password
that was contained in the email. Users were more than happy to do that,
even after years of education, and dozens of technological hurdles.
All because they wanted to see the dancing bunny.”
So, at the risk of being repetitive, don’t try to see the dancing
bunnies. You can keep a computer reasonably secure, so long as you never
connect it to anything else. But, who wants to go back to the
pre-internet days, right? Well you do if you want to be secure in the
use of covert networking. Keep another computer as your “dancing
bunnies” and internet surfing computer. Continue to watch youtube videos
with your iphone or android. Just don’t use them for in-network
communications. Generate your content on a standalone computer that you
keep with an encrypted hard drive (don’t know how? The internet does. If
you don’t understand what the Internet is telling you, don’t use a
computer for this). Pass your messages encrypted on a CD or thumb-drive
that is only used on your in-network system (thumb drives are much
easier to use in a dead-drop than a CD, but both have good roles).
Putting your in-network thumbdrive on your regular internet computer
means you just gave a virus to everyone else on the network, and
possibly just gave the whole real-world identity of the network to the
authorities. DON’T DO IT! THIS MEANS YOU!
So, without computers and telephones, we’re back to REALLY OLD SCHOOL
techniques. Benefit of these is that the rumored NSA sniffing/tracking
systems won’t work. Draw back is, they are low bandwidth.
• The Dead Drop – is the practice of securing a package of information
(encoded, of course) in a public space such that it is unobserved, and
will only be found by the designated person to retrieve it. A classic
example is to attach the package to the underside of a postal box, and
to leave an otherwise innocuous mark somewhere else (Newspaper on a park
bench, a certain window left open, etc. etc. etc. The limit is your
imagination). The other party will see the indicator signal and retrieve
the package. A given dead-drop should not be used for bi-directional
communication. This needs to be pre-arranged by both parties involved,
but neither party actually has to know who the other is.
• The Live Drop – the converse of the dead drop, both parties meet
face-to-face to exchange information. This has the benefit of not
leaving information in a public place, but has the drawback of having to
meet in person. This can be a meet-in-passing (akin to
pick-pocketing), or an actual meeting that both attend, or anything in
between (ever see someone carrying a briefcase or other lockable case
walk into a Wendy’s, order a small frosty, then sit at a table waiting
for someone else, who joins him later, and then leaves with the case? It
happens. Have you seen it?)
• Remote Messaging – Once you have something encrypted and ready to
send, you can use regular email to send the encrypted blob (either as an
attachment or in-line). Not sure how to do this? Don’t.
• Disaster Signal – use this to indicate that you have been made, or
that you are going rabbit. This tells everyone who knows this signal
that they are not to trust your regular routes as they may have been
compromised.
Look them up. There are plenty more out there. This is not intended to
be a full FM on how to perform each and every possible task, but an
intro level guide into things to think about and research. This is a
beginning, not the full instruction manual. Much of it will be written
by you as you go along, as these things always have been.
Footnotes:
1. The Russian Revolution, on the other hand, actually
was a semi-spontaneous event that took everyone, including most of the revolutionaries, by surprise (people, not entirely accidentally, tend to confuse the two). However, this too had seen the groundwork laid years and decades beforehand. Most of the participants weren't even born when Czar Alexander II was assassinated.
The Bolsheviks were among the weaker organizations in 1917, and considered Russian society too primative for a communist uprising. However, their discipline, flexibility and organizational skills is what allowed them to outclass their leftist rivals politically and their rightist rivals militarily.
2. There is a small subset of the human populace who can effectively fight and kill out of intellect and not sentiment. These people are called sociopaths, and high-functioning sociopaths at that. Thing is, there's not many of them in any given society, you might not want to have one watching your back, and they're said to be a little scary (wouldn't know, myself).
3. Takes all types...
http://mountainguerrilla.wordpress.com/2013/09/04/comments-on-leaderless-resistance-from-a-professional/
Comments on Leaderless Resistance, from a Professional
(The following was posted in comments by reader “Frank
Pinelander.” For anyone not at all familiar with Special Forces lore and
training, Pineland is the notional land where much of our training
takes place during the Q-Course, so “Frank Pinelander” indicates either
an SF veteran or someone who has supported SF training as a contractor
or role-player. I don’t know of course, because I don’t personally know
Frank. The comments below were sent to him and they are spot-on,
and something a whole lot of dumb morons need to read.
While I don’t agree with everything herein, the overall
message, regarding Leaderless Resistance and it’s fatal flaws, is
spot-on.
Italicized parenthetical comments are, as always, my own.–JM)
Author: SMB (US Army, Retired)
Edited for content.
A Brief Overview
Nothing defines the blatant ineptitude and rank incompetence of the
radical resistance more starkly than the concept of so-called
“leaderless resistance” (hereafter, LR). By its very nature LR amounts
to little more than anarchy and, as demonstrated by some of the most
recent examples, very rapidly degenerates into simple banditry.
Furthermore, one notes for the record that the most vociferous
proponents of LR have, in common with those to whom that fantastic idea
appeals, exactly zero experience in guerrilla warfare, its theory, or
practice.
Simply stated, the concept of LR posits that individuals or small,
close-knit groups, acting on their own initiative, performing their own
targeting and relying on their own resources, can strike at the
government’s infrastructure at will without fear of infiltration.
Tactically, LR ranges from individual nuisance acts for the sake of
causing a nuisance on one end of the spectrum to small unit terrorism
for terrorism’s sake on the other. However, nothing can be said about
LR’s potential operational impact because, by definition, through
rejection of any superior organizational structure, it can have no
operational impact.
Strategically, LR is conspicuously absent from any historical
examples of successful insurgency. The idea has been advanced by several
writers on the subject that LR is essentially a modern version of the
Committees of Correspondence of American Revolution fame. I do not think
those writers mean to purposely distort the realities of revolutionary
organization in the colonies, but their zeal to justify LR apparently
overrode their rational faculties. If those writers had simply paused to
consider the word “committee” juxtaposed with “correspondence”, the
notion that Committees of Correspondence were autonomous bodies acting
independently of one another would have collapsed of its own illogic. In
fact, the members of the several colonies’ Committees of Correspondence
were appointed by their colonies’ legislative bodies, everyone knew who
they were, and they coordinated their activities between each other or
with the Continental Congress through a chain of command. Hardly an
example of leaderless resistance (
in fact, the only close to
functional example of psuedo-successful LR would have to be Earth First,
and last time I checked, we’re still logging and driving fuel-guzzling
SUVs, so that could hardly be considered particularly successful
either…–JM)[1]
There are however several striking examples, discussed below, that
demonstrate why LR is fundamentally flawed as a resistance strategy.
The Order
“The Order” is frequently cited as an example (in its early stages,
before it began recruiting) of the principle of LR. Given that most
members of The Order are either dead or in federal prisons it is also an
example of many of the fundamental flaws in the concept.
The Order began as an eight man cell dedicated to creating an Aryan
homeland in the Pacific Northwest. How eight men expected to accomplish
that objective has never been clearly explained, but following their
logic it seems that the organizers of The Order believed that direct
action against the government for the purpose of financing other
organizations in the racialist resistance would inspire others to
imitate their example thus creating an avalanche effect as other self
creating “cells” rallied to the cause. Predictably, that “strategy”
failed miserably.
Had the organizers of The Order expended half the effort in
researching failed insurgencies as they did planning armored car and
bank heists they would have found that their strategy (if indeed they
ever had one beyond “do things”) had already been tried by no less than
Che Guevara. The name of that “strategy” is called the Loco (i.e.,
focus). The theory is this: Plunk a small band of guerrillas down in an
ostensibly “oppressed” countryside, begin maiming, murdering and robbing
the oppressors, and the peasants will rise up and flock in proletarian
support to the Loco to sweep the bourgeoisie from the political
landscape.[2] However, the “oppressed” in whose name Che fought snitched
off his band to the oppressors, and Che and his Bolivian Loco bandits
were hunted down like animals and killed. End of insurgency.
Aside from robbing banks and armored cars and sharing the loot with
phone booth emperors who were vying for the same mailing list, The Order
did manage to kill a Jew in Denver, blow up a synagogue in Boise,
Idaho, and murder one of their own recruits before they were finally
hunted down, killed or arrested.
The Order therefore illustrates Reason #1 LR does not work. “Grass
roots” resistance is doomed to failure; there are no examples of it
having ever succeeded. Frustrated by any appreciable effect of
propaganda on a population so dim it could offer not even neutrality,
and impatient with time proven organizational principles, they simply
decided to “kick things off” themselves armed with nothing but a single
idea that was immediately discredited because (1) the population did not
care about the idea, so (2) they possessed no means of enlisting
assistance or acceptance for their crime spree. The lesson learned about
The Order’s example is that rebelliousness has no place in a
resistance.[3]
Eric Rudolph[4]
Personally, my reaction to the bombing of abortion clinics and gay
bars is, “Where’s the crime?” In many respects Rudolph exemplifies LR at
the individual level. He didn’t make threats or discuss his plans with
anybody, he didn’t ask permission, he simply started punctuating his
deeply held beliefs with explosions.
If Rudolph has one thing going for him (aside from being the “1997 –
1999 Hide and Seek Champion of the World”) it’s that he has a steep
learning curve. Note the successive “product improvements” of his
devices. He obviously paid close attention to the official Bomb Damage
Assessments of his handiwork, and progressively applied those lessons
learned to his subsequent projects, not only mechanically (although he
had not yet come to appreciate that nails are crap for shrapnel — ball
bearings are much better, having sounder ballistics) but also
tactically.
For example, constructive development of Rudolph’s devices progresses
to smaller timers, smaller batteries, dynamite instead of pipe bombs
and thicker pressure plates. By the time of the Atlanta gay bar and
abortion clinic bombings his devices fit very nicely into a book bag,
and at the lesbian bar he left behind an 80 pound time delay “present”
intended for enthusiastic crime scene investigators. A year later, a
Birmingham, Alabama, cop who was guarding an abortion clinic between
stints as a guard at a gay bar, poked at a flower pot with his baton
causing Rudolph to allegedly command detonate his device (or lose it to
the bomb squad). Significantly, the device was directional, the majority
of the blast was focused on the front door. Eric’s obvious goal was to
abort the abortionist when he arrived, but the cop’s ill considered
curiosity preempted the objective of the attack. Nevertheless, Rudolph
had progressed from crude pipe bombs to command detonated directional
devices in four operations. Not bad.
Rudolph’s problem was that, while his devices advanced both
mechanically and in lethality, their basic construction, and therefore
their “signature,” remained the same. Because he was driving his own
vehicle to and from the target area the feds quickly obtained a
description of it and the plate number, and by the time he had driven
back in Murphy, North Carolina, the FBI was scouring the city for him.
Informed by friends that he was being sought by the FBI as a “material
witness” to the Birmingham bombing, he did the next logical thing. He
went to Burger King, bought some chow, then disappeared into the
mountains.
What is remarkable about Rudolph, as an individual example of LR, is
his focus, his dedication, his coolness, his self reliance, and his
aggressiveness — and that he is still alive. In fact, by the spring of
1999, the FBI had almost completely retreated out of the mountains and
into their compound in Andrews, North Carolina, because, in the words of
SSA Terry Turchie, Rudolph manhunt director, “We think he is hunting
us.”
But those very qualities that make young Eric so remarkable are
precisely those qualities that make him not only the exception to the
rule, but also a positive example of why LR on an individual level is
again doomed to failure except in the rarest of circumstances. Eric
possesses what precious few other individuals who might contemplate the
“Rudolph model” of LR possess — the semblance of an infrastructure.
Young Eric’s infrastructure is composed entirely of friends of belief in
kind, or tacit sympathy for the act even if not for his beliefs.
However, that necessarily delimited his operational radius. And even
though Rudolph enjoys the active neutrality of the population in his
area of operations, his limited circle of friends lacked any
infrastructure that would have enabled him wider range in his holy
mission.
What Rudolph’s circle of friends were incapable of providing was
operational support. He procured his own explosives and materiel. He
built his own bombs. He performed his own targeting. He emplaced his own
devices. He provided his own transportation. His circle of friends were
useless operationally, and the best they could do for him locally when
he became a fugitive was turn a blind eye when he raided their chicken
coops or delay reporting his presence when he broke into their houses to
raid the cupboard.
Eric Rudolph therefore illustrates Reason #2 LR does not work. It has
no formal infrastructure, thus its support is at best haphazard and is
always uncoordinated. Consequently, such notional “support” is bound to
fall apart at the seams at some point. Even though there is not yet any
evidence that his network of friends is beginning to crumble, it is
painfully obvious that they are incapable of supporting or sustaining
any further operations by Eric. The lesson learned about Eric Rudolph’s
example is that independence of action means isolation from effective
support, hence an inability to sustain operations in the face of
determined opposition reaction.
Further Considerations
The above examples of group and individual LR illustrate only a very
small number of associated problems. For example, as mentioned in the
Eric Rudolph example, the lack of a formal organizational infrastructure
means that LR “cells” must provide for themselves everything
appertaining their operational requirements. This fact necessarily
places the LR “cell” in the unenviable position of being personally
involved in all the activities, such as logistics (including financing),
communications, targeting and planning, needed to execute their
operations. Because of their personal involvement they dramatically
raise not only their own “profile,” but also that of the operation.
Those named activities in a properly constituted resistance organization
would be delegated to cells (unknown to the “direct action” operatives)
specifically tasked to perform those functions thus virtually
eliminating the operation’s profile — until bodies need to be dug out of
the rubble. Traditional procedures also so diffuse the opposition’s
post action investigation that it takes months or years, instead of days
in the case of an LR “plan,” to unravel all the pre-mission details and
thereby identify and begin hunting the operatives.
Furthermore, LR as a “strategy,” if we are to believe what its
proponents expect us to believe about it, has specific appeal only to
the lowest (or most psychotic) common denominator within any given
organization. The fact that the notion of LR is being propagated should
give pause to serious minded individuals because those organizations
that promote LR almost universally make their appeals for membership to
the “proletariat,” as demonstrated by the crudeness of their rhetoric
and public manifestations. Nevertheless, the idea that independently
conceived and executed “grassroots” action solely for the sake of action
can have any appreciable impact as a resistance methodology to the
planned destruction of our society is nonsense. And if the history of LR
is any indicator it plays right into our enemy’s hand.
Consider the Progressive distorted prosecutive “legal” strategy known
as vicarious liability. In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence vicarious
liability is the “indirect or imputed legal responsibility for the acts
of another… as between an employer and employee… or a principle for
torts and contracts of an agent.” (Black’s 6th ed.) In a nut shell, the
Progressive-contorted version of vicarious liability contends that “hate
speech” creates a “climate of hate” that propels small groups or
individuals to commit “hate crimes” and that, therefore, any
organization that espouses Progressive-defined “hate” is “responsible”
for the actions of individuals or groups, employees or not, who commit
the “crime.”[5]
Never mind that the Progressive-version of vicarious liability
perfectly inverts the traditions of Anglo-Saxon legal precedent which
places responsibility for crime upon the individual criminal and which
reserves vicarious liability to employers whose agents’ (i.e.,
responsible to the employer) acts result in willful harm to others. In
the example of the justifiable murder of the abortionist Sleppian, a web
site that listed the names, addresses and photographs of abortionists
was ordered to shut down even though there was no proof of any
connection between the owners of the web site and the righteous man who
dwindled our Progressive infestation by one. The web site had “created a
climate of hate,” you see. (It seems the web site was honest enough to
leave Sleppian’s data intact — with an “X” through it. This was deemed
to encourage others to cross other abortionists off the list. One hopes
so.)
The Progressive-twisted version of vicarious liability is reserved
solely for Christian men and their organizations. Why? Eric Rudolph
serves as another example. Hundreds of FBI agents [has anybody else
noticed that the FBI refers to its personnel using the same term
intelligence officers understand as “street shit?”] are hunting him, and
a million dollar reward has been offered for him, not because he
allegedly planted a couple of bombs, but because he committed a
politically incorrect crime; he tried to blow up abortionists and gays.
His motive is the reason he is being hunted.
In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence motive is merely a mitigating factor.
When Progressives are permitted to practice law — or more horrifying,
make law — in Anglo-Saxon nations, the law rapidly degenerates into
quibbling. In the case of vicarious liability, the extrinsic motive
becomes the real crime. In other words, what you were thinking when you
committed the crime is more important than what you did, and what you
were thinking is the fault of the organization – whether you are a
member or not — that espouses what you believe. Ergo, according to
Progressive lawyers, the organization is vicariously liable for your
crime and can be sued. The most recent Southern Poverty Law Center law
suit against the Aryan Nations is only the most recent in a pattern of
similar suits.
Why the long winded speech about vicarious liability? Because the
organizations that promote LR are being sued in rotation by Progressives
when proletarian groups or individuals (employees, members, or not)
take them at their word and begin practicing it. Significantly,
organizations that demand at least a modicum of discipline from their
members and which prefer to recruit from the bourgeoisie, have so far
been spared the embarrassment of “loose cannons” in their ranks. Think
about it.
How “It” Is Really Done
What often amazes me is the simple-mindedness of those who propose to
wage one or the other of many forms of armed resistance against the
government. Because the sheer scale of the proposition cannot be grasped
by minds conditioned to think in terms of snappy political slogans and
time frames rarely exceeding seven minutes between commercial breaks, I
often find that when the scale is explained to them their response is
blank incomprehension. This inability to grasp the complexity and
magnitude of the proposition is but one reason why such ideas as
Leaderless Resistance gain currency.
Among all the outpourings about LR, the only comprehensible rationale
given for promoting anarcho-resistance is the fear of opposition
infiltration and penetration of properly constituted organizations.
That
rationale is the very reason LR should be dismissed out of hand as the
drivel of flagrant neophytes who possess just enough comic book
knowledge about armed resistance to be dangerously stupid (emphasis
added –JM); and who are irresponsible enough to share their “knowledge” with others.
The reason advocates of LR advance the fear of infiltration as their
only comprehensible rationale for promoting anarcho-resistance is
because, like every other band of proletarian dissidents, they believe
that resistance begins with armed groups. In other words, they organize
everything backwards, from the bottom up. This does, as they fear, leave
them vulnerable to penetration when they finally discover that they
cannot support or sustain their own operations and of necessity need to
recruit new members or organize some semblance of a support apparatus.
Armed resistance is only one subset of what is properly defined as
Political Warfare. Policy making in Political Warfare encompasses
ideological warfare, organizational warfare, psychological warfare
(wherein falls armed resistance), intelligence warfare, and mass
warfare. Within the subset of armed resistance we find planned political
violence (assassination, kidnapping, bombing), which is employed as a
tactic of both disruptive and coercive terrorism. The disruptive nature
of terrorism is the repression of and reprisals against the general
population that it provokes from government. As a coercive measure
terrorism enforces obedience from noncombatants or punctuates the
demands of the terrorists.
Note the words “policy” and “planned.” That means there must be a
policy making body who turn their deliberated decisions over to another
organizational element which plans the implementation of those policies,
in turn delegating responsibility for executing the plan to further
subordinate elements. This requires not only a centralized command
element that makes decisions, but also a staff who turn those decisions
into mission taskings to the staffs of subordinate resistance
activities. In descending order of manpower and complexity of
organization those activities are, (1) the underground, (2) the
auxiliary, and (3) the guerrillas.
Mission tasking, broadly speaking, covers five basic categories; (1)
action, (2) security, (3) cover and logistics, (4) surveillance and
intelligence, and (5) communications. Each category is serviced by in
independent element. Each element’s requirements are then forwarded to
management who assemble the information into a mission planning guide
and requirements list. Once this information is assembled, planning
follows an ordered sequence.
The Intelligence Cycle sets into motion collection operations in
response to the informational needs expressed in the requirements list.
Targeting is highly discriminatory, begins very early in the planning
process, and includes consideration of both primary and sub-targets.
Wargaming, which considers the action to be taken and the probability of
success of several courses of action. Protection, which prevents
discovery, prevention of arrest, and provision for building and
maintaining cover. Operational Support falls into five broad categories;
(1) communications, (2) accommodations, (3) transportation, (4)
technological support, and (5) supply. Planning of the final phase,
Action, does not begin until all other planning requirements have been
met.[6]
LR objections to the foregoing model are, as already stated, the fear
of infiltration and betrayal by government informants or penetration of
the organization by government spies. The reason I mentioned my disdain
for the tendency among the various proletarian organizations to
organize armed cells first (i.e., do the whole thing backward) earlier
in this essay is because organizing backward creates the very condition
that leaves their groups open to infiltration and betrayal — their
eventual necessity to organize some form of support. To do this they
need to recruit from outside their immediate circle.[7]
Tim McVeigh & Co. is an excellent example. When they realized they
could not pull off their operation on their own they began enlisting
support from people and organizations who really had no business knowing
what they were up to. Within hours of the OKC bombing the FBI was all
over them like flies on dung (and there is considerable evidence that
the FBI began manipulating the operation about midway through their
“planning”).[8]
The point I am making is this: In a properly organized resistance one
of the first things constituted is an overarching counterintelligence
body that permeates the very fabric of the organization at all levels.
Coincident with counterintelligence is the compartmentalization of the
resistance organization and planning — something almost totally lacking
in LR “cells.”
Furthermore, for those among you who think that resistance warfare is
some type of free-booting tryst where “rugged individuals” can “get
some back” from their oppressors, I suggest you stay home with the
women. The authoritarianism and regulation of the standing military
pales in comparison to the rigid authoritarianism, regulation and
submission to duty found in resistance organizations.
Although some small measure of disjointed disruption may be achieved
by LR, and although LR may exert some paltry degree of temporary
coercion, its lack of far ranging planning, organizational discipline,
coordination with other elements, or a support net designed to sustain
operations will find them littering the streets with their corpses.
If there is a single good thing to be said about LR, it is that while
LR “cells” are distracting the Enemy, the grown-ups can go about their
more serious business.[9]
Footnotes:
1. LR is working rather well in the Muslim world last I checked, even if they largely adapted it due to attrition on the part of their leadership. The Lebanese didn't even bother with upper management the last time Israeli Tanks rolled across their border (knew that Mossad hit teams would hunt them all down within a matter of days), they just planted weapons and explosives throughout country, ran a few Specials on the Battle of Grozny, and told the youngsters to go hunting.
Speaking of Grozny, Chechnya is still a semi-dangerous place, despite the fact that Chechen leaders and indeed Chechen people are getting rare outside of Hell and Boston.
Al Qaeda is doing better without Osama bin Laden than he could have ever dreamed. They still have Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, parts of Egypt, parts of Syria, part of whichever other country we choose to invade next (blame the last two American presidents for that if you wish, but it's pretty good showing for a group who think they have to blow THEMSELVES up before they can harm the enemy).
2. Here again he's a little off on his history. Che got basically 50/50 results: win in Cuba, stalemate in the Congo, loss in Bolivia. Fair odds, considering that he and Castro had adapted the strategy because previous, more conventional ones had failed. Also, the Zapatistas did fine.
3. Should have borrowed from Hunter instead of the Turner Diaries. As I recall, the protagonist in the former actually admits that his lone wolf activity ain't causing enough damage to hurt the System, and couldn't be maintained long-term even if it was.
4. In-game resistance leader Robert Donner is loosely based off of Eric
Robert Rudolph; he was going to have a bigger role as an NPC but it didn't really work. I've read
his writings on what happened while he was on the run, and personally I think he's telling the truth about receiving no overt help from the locals. Very few of the uneducated right-wing fundamentalist hillbillies who populate the hills of Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee and North Carolina approved his actions (speaking as an uneducated right-wing fundamentalist hillbilly myself), but the Feds didn't make friends by treating us all as though we did.
So did we turn a blind eye to some of his doings? Maybe. That brings up a good point: the locals don't neccessarily have to help you or even like you. They merely have to hate you less than they hate the System. With Eric Rudolph, we had the choice between the son of moonshiners and the sons of revenuers. We knew exactly who to go with.
Eric Rudolph (probably) had
paranoid personality disorder. It's unlikely he would have ever functioned well in a direct-action group and was perhaps better suited to work alone. Much like
Ted Kaczynski— whom I'm surprised receives no mention— would still be sending bombs if he hadn't wrote letters or his brother hadn't ratted on him.
5. On the other hand:
Aesop's Trumpeter. Under that interpretation, the System and it's organs have every right to discourage, punish, and kill those who encourage, sympathize or are neutral towards disruptive dissidents (can run both ways, but only if the trumpeter's people win). And... that might be exactly what the dissidents want.
Why? He touches on this later, but one of the key points of revolutionary agitprop is forcing a crackdown by the authorities that will make their citizens hate and fear them.
Join or die. That's what Tito told the Yugoslavian peasants when the Nazis started massacring them. The Chetniks, who had actually been fighting the Nazis longer and more effectively, gave up in the face of reprisals and eventually started collaborating... it saved Serbian lives in the short term but they've had to spend 70 years under the heels of Communists, Muslims and EUrocrats because of it. Tito knew that reprisals against non-combatants would drive a wedge between them and the authorities, and inspire many who wouldn't have gotten involved to flee into the arms of the partisans rather than wait around for the next reprisal. Mao did much the same in China.
6. This seems like the crux of the whole essay, and the biggest reason why I reposted it. What SFC Barry is suggesting is merely specialization, something that many LR proponents also desire to an extant.
Problem that arises with it is the issue of trust. Not the aforementioned fear of spies and turncoats, but the fear that your own people may not be up to task. You've never met these people, their capabilities are completely unknown to you, and will only be proven
after the battle. If you're in a direct-action cell, would you really trust the security cell to keep a secret, the surveillance cell to figure out what you're walking into, the logistics cell to get you out, the communications cell to keep you all in contact, and the leadership cell to make the right decisions? For that matter, would any of those trust the direct-action cell not to get themselves killed and make a waste of all their effort? I can see why five specialized cells working under one leadership cell would be more effective than six independent direct-action cells (or even six direct-action cells with one assigning tasks to the others based on their secondary specialities; more or less how I imagine the Donner Parties), but I don't know if those on the ground would.
7. Hah hah... of course we would never do that.
8. Quite possibly. For that matter, I still think the Boston Bombing was an entrapment scheme gone wrong.
9. Unnecessarily patronizing, no? If one must be claim that LR proponents are disproportionately anarchists, may one also surmise that those desiring a strict, top-down system tend to be fascists? I wouldn't agree with either assertion, nor would I say that either system is always the right one in all situations.
